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THE PROBATIVE VALUE OF TESTIMONY FROM
THE HYPNOTICALLY REFRESHED RECOLLECTION
I. INTRODUCTION
'rT]HE EXPERIENCE of the last three centuries of judicial trials has dem-
.L 3 onstrated that in disputed issues one cannot depend upon the mere
assertion of anybody, however plausible, without scrutiny into its basis."'
The recent increase in the use of hypnotic memory enhancement on the
victims and witnesses of crimes,2 as well as on defendants' and plaintiffs'
witnesses, necessitates an in-depth examination of the reliability of hyp-
nosis as a basis for testimony or statements of persons who are speaking
from a hypno-enhanced recollection. Such an examination of hypnosis
reveals that hypnotically enhanced memories are likely to be fraught with
fantasized and falsely suggested information as a result of the hypnotic
process. Even where stringent procedural safeguards are followed,3 it may
be impossible to detect the memory distorting effects of hypnosis. Thus the
reliability of the hypnotically refreshed memory is to a significant degree,
a matter of speculation. As a result, the probative value of statements and
testimony from the hypno-enhanced recollection is marginal at best and
rarely outweighs its potential to mislead the trier of fact." Although many
courts freely admit such evidence, the better practice would be to admit
it only in exceptional circumstances and under the strictest procedural
guidelines.
II. NATURE AND HISTORY OF HYPNOSIS
The discovery of hypnosis is generally credited to Franz Anton Mes-
'H. WIGMORE, A STuDENT7'S TFXrBOOK ON T LAW OF EVIDENCE 238 (1935).
2 Monrose, Justice with Glazed Eyes-the Growing Use of Hypnotism in Law Enforcement,
Juius DocToR, Oct. 1978 at 54. See also TWME, Sept. 13, 1976, at 56, which describes the
Los Angeles "Svengali Squad," a group of officers trained in the use of hypnosis.
a The first attempt to establish definitive safeguarding procedures appears to have been in
the United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193, 199 (9th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1006
(1978). The court suggested that, at a minimum, stenographic records be maintained of
all hypnotic sessions with the witness. It was not until April, 1980, however, that any re-
ported case attempted to put forth comprehensive guidelines designed to reduce the unre-
liability of hypno-refreshed recollection. See State v. Hurd, 173 NJ. Super. 333, 414 A.2d
291 (1980) and People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
' The scope of this comment will be limited to the admissibility of statements or testimony
from the hypno-enhanced recollection and foundational evidence involved therewith. The
following topics will not be discussed except as they relate to the topic at hand:
A. The right of the accused to have his memory refreshed by hypnosis. See State ex rel.
Sheppard v. Koblentz, 174 Ohio St. 120, 187 N.E.2d 40 (1962), cert. denied, 373 U.S.
911 (1972).
B. Expert testimony as to mental state of defendant based on observations of defendant
while under hypnosis. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Langly, 468 Pa. 392, 363 A.2d
1126 (1976), People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App. 2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1968).
C. Expert testimony as to credibility of witness based upon observations of witness
while under hypnosis. See e.g., Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316 (Okla. Crim. App.,
1975).
D. Use of hypnosis against the subject's will. See People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353,
98 N.E.2d 553 (1951).
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mer (1734-1815).' Mesmer cured patients in seance-like encounters by
transmitting what he theorized to be "animal magnetism" to the affected
parts of patients' bodies through metal rods.' The technique as it is known
today, however, did not attract widespread scientific interest until the 1880's
when Sigmund Freud endorsed its use (only to reject it several years later
in favor of free association.) 7 Finally, in 1958, the American Medical As-
sociation officially endorsed the medical use of hypnosis by recognizing
its place in the "treatment of certain illnesses when employed by qualified
medical and dental personnel."8
Although hypnosis has been heavily studied, there is no generally
accepted explanatory theory.' Hypnosis has been described in the cases as
a "highly suggestible state into which a willing subject is induced by a
skilled therapist""0 or as a "heightened or intense state of concentration which
enables the subject to recall past events that, for a variety of reasons, the
subject was unable to remember."'" More comprehensive, scientific definitions
describe hypnosis in terms of its characteristics. Hilgard observed these
seven characteristics:
1. Subsidence of the planning function. The hypnotized subject loses
initiative and lacks the desire to make and carry out plans of his
own ...
2. Redistribution of attention .... [U]nder hypnosis selective atten-
tion and selective inattention go beyond the usual range ....
3. Availability of visual memories from the past, and heightened ability
for fantasy-production .... The memories are not all veridical,
and the hypnotist can in fact suggest the reality of memories for
events that did not happen.
4. Reduction in reality testing and a tolerance for persistent reality
distortion .... Reality distortions of all kinds, including acceptance
of falsified memories... and all manner of other unrealistic dis-
tortions can be accepted without criticism within the hypnotic state.
5. Increased suggestibility. The suggestibility theory of hypnosis is so
5 Spector & Foster, Admissibility of Hypnotic Statements: Is the Law of Evidence Suscep-
tible?, 38 OHIo ST. L.J. 567, 568-69 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Spector].
6 Id. at 569.
T 9 ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA 133, 134 (ed. 1979) [hereinafter cited as Orne]. Dr. Martin
Orne, the article's author, is a professor of psychiatry at the University of Pennsylvania.
He is widely respected as a clinical and research expert on hypnosis. See Diamond, Inher-
ent Problems in the Use of Pretrial Hypnosis on a Prospective Witness, 68 CAL. L.R. 313,
332 (1980) [hereinafter cited as Diamond].
$ COUNCIL ON MENTAL HEALTH, Medical Use of Hypnosis, 168 J.A.M.A. 186, 187 (1958),
reprinted in Note, Admissibility of Present Recollection Restored by Hypnosis---State v.
McQueen, 15 WAKE FOREST L. REv. at 357 n.2 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Present Recol-
lection Restored].
9 Orne, supra note 7.
10 State v. Mack ......... Minn .......... 292 N.W.2d 764, 765 (1980) quoting I. COLEMAN,
ABNORMAL PSYCHOLOGY AND MODERN LIFE 579 (2d ed. 1960).
12 Statc v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super, 333, 337, 414 A.2d 291, 294.
[Vol. 14:4
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widely accepted that hypnosis and suggestibility come to be equated
by some writers on hypnosis.
6. Role behavior. The suggestions that a subject in hypnosis will ac-
cept are not limited to specific acts or perceptions; he will, indeed,
adopt a suggested role and carry on complex activities correspond-
ing to that role.
7. Amnesia for what transpired within the hypnotic state .... [Am-
nesia] is not an essential aspect of hypnosis.., yet is a very common
phenomenon, and it can be furthered through suggestion. 2
Hypnotic states have also been separated in several levels or depths ranging
from a light trance to a deep trance, each trance being more or less dis-
tinguishable by mental and physical characteristics manifested by the sub-
ject.1 3
Of the numerous known hypnotic phenomena, this comment is pri-
marily concerned with that known as age-regression. This is a special sort
of hypnotic memory distortion where the subject appears to relive or simply
recall events that he was unable to recall while in a normal state of con-
sciousness." Controlled studies, however, do not support the popular myth
that the mind stores forever all sensory impressions in photographic detail. 5
Facts that were never consciously observed and stored in the memory cannot
be recalled even under the deepest trance.16 In fact, Dr. Orne states that
the belief that hypnosis facilitates memory has not been supported by ade-
quately controlled research. 17
III. HYPNOSIS AND THE LAW
The issues in the cases which have dealt with the ramifications of
recollection refreshed by hypnosis seem to fall into three readily definable
categories. 8 The most common issue is whether a person whose memory
has been refreshed through pre-trial 9 hypnosis should be permitted to testify
12E. HU.GARD, THE EXPERIENCE OF HYPNOSIS 6-10 (1968). [hereinafter cited as Hilgard].
These characteristics are also listed and discussed in Diamond, supra note 7, at 316.
13 Spector, supra note 5, at 571.
14 Orne, supra note 7, at 136.
15 Id.
16 Levendula, The Possible Role of Hypnosis in Criminal Investigation, in CIUMINAL IN-
VESTIGATION AND INTERROOATION 335, 340 (S. Gerber & 0. Schroeder eds. 1962).
17 Orne, supra note 7, at 137.
18 A vast majority of the cases are criminal cases. In fact, only three civil cases are re-
ported where the plaintiff sought to admit hypno-enchanced testimony. Connolly v. Farmer,
484 F.2d 456 (5th Cir. 1973); Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506 (9th Cir.
1974); Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1975). Because the majority
of case law is criminal, most of this comment will deal with hypnosis in the criminal trial
setting. However, the principles and analysis discussed apply equally to the use of hypno-
enhanced recollection in the civil setting.
19 Only one American case was found where a person was actually hypnotized in court,
but in that case the jury was excused before the procedure was conducted. As a result
of the defendant's testimony under hypnosis in that case. the first degree murder chargo
COMMENTS
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from his hypno-enhanced recollection. 0 Another recurring issue is the ad-
missibility of an out-of-court statement made while under hypnosis.2 Finally,
the increasing use of hypnosis to refresh recollection has given rise to
foundational evidence questions in two contexts. First, what type of founda-
tion is required prior to admitting testimony from the hypno-enhanced
recollection, and second, may observations of, or tapes of the subject while
under hypnosis be used to establish a foundation for expert testimony on the
subject's mental state or credibility.2 2
A. Testimony from Hypno-enhanced Recollection
A majority of the cases that deal with hypnosis involve the admissi-
bility of testimony from hypno-enhanced recollection by prosecutors' or
plaintiffs' witnesses. In admitting such testimony into evidence, many courts
have held that the fact that a witness' memory was refreshed through hyp-
nosis affects the weight of the testimony rather than its admissibility.2"
Professor Diamond," however, holds the view that once a witness' memory
has been enhanced by hypnotism, his recollections become so contaminated
that he is rendered incompetent to testify.2 Other courts have admitted
was reduced to manslaughter to which the defendant pled guilty. State v. Nebb, No. 39,
540 (Ohio Corn. Pl., Franklin Co., May 25, 1962), discussed in Dilloff, The Admissibility
of Hypnotically Influenced Testimony, 4 Omo N.U.L.R. 1, 12 (1977). However, in Regina
v. Pitt, 68 D.L.R. 2d 513 (1967), the Supreme Court of British Columbia permitted a
defendant to be induced into a trance before the jury for the limited purpose of planting
the post-hypnotic suggestion that after the hypnosis the defendant would be able to recall
the event. This case is cited in Spector, supra note 5, at 596.
20See Harding, v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 949
(1969). In this case, a rape-shooting victim was unable to identify the defendant prior to
hypnosis. She was permitted to testify and identify the defendant in court from hypno-
refreshed memory. Harding was not followed in People v. Harper, 111 Ill. App. 2d 204,
250 N.E.2d 5 (1969). The reliability of hypnosis was not found sufficient to permit the
rape victim to testify from a hypno-enhanced memory.
21 See Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456. There the hypnotist's testimony as to statements
made by plaintiff while under hypnosis were found to be inadmissible. In People v. Mod-
esto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (1963) tapes of hypno-enduced
statements were held to be admissible to establish a foundation for a hypnotist's expert
opinion as to the defendant's mental state. No cases were found where out-of-court hypno-
enduced statements were admitted as substantive evidence.
22People v. Hughes, 99 Misc. 2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643 (1979) (foundation of general
scientific acceptance of the technique and adequate procedural safeguards required);
United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied ......... U.S ......... , 100
S. Ct. 179 (1979) (no foundation required as to nature and effect of hypnosis before
witness testifies from hypno-enhanced recollection); People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App.2d 47,
92 Cal. Rptr. 906 (1968) (tapes of hypno-enduced statements held inadmissible to establish
foundation for expert opinion on mental state); People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382
P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (error to summarily exclude tapes of hypno-enduced state-
ments without exercising judicial discretion).
2
8Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 949
(1968); State v. Jorgensen, 8 Or. App. 1, 492 P.2d 312 (1971); State v. Temoney, 45
Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240 (1980); United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d 667; Wyller
v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506; Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d 1067.
24 Professor Diamond is a Professor of Law at the University of California, Berkeley, and
Clinical Professor of Psychiatry at the University of California, San Francisco. See Diamond,
supra note 7.
25 d. at 314,
[Vol. 14:4
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such testimony on the ground that any evidence that aids the jury should
be admitted.2 6 Due to the unreliable nature of hypnosis in enhancing recol-
lection, it is questionable whether such evidence can actually assist the
jury in rendering a premised, non-speculative decision.
It has also been held that hypnosis should be treated no differently
than any traditional memory-refreshing device.27 This view apparently springs
from the idea that any memorandum or device may be used to stimulate
present recollection." Hypnosis, however, acts as far more than a mere
stimulus to the recollection. It can add to, displace or otherwise heavily
distort the recollection of the subject."9 "Imagination and suggestion are
twin artists ever ready to retouch the fading daguerrotype of memory."3
For the subject under hypnosis, imagination and suggestion may destroy
the whole role of film and substitute another in its place.
B. Pre-trial Statements Made While Under Hypnosis
The courts have uniformly excluded evidence of pre-trial statements
made while under hypnosis when offered as substantive evidence.3 This
issue seems to arise most often when the defendants seek to admit excul-
patory statements made while under a trance. People v. Ebanks is the first
reported case found to have considered the evidentiary problems of hypnosis.
In excluding pre-trial hypnotic statements by the defendant espousing his
innocence, the court held simply "that the law of the United States does
not recognize hypnotism." 3 In more recent cases, similar evidence was
excluded because it was hearsay, ' because hypnosis was not sufficiently
reliable, and because the jury might have given it undue credence." ° In
cases where the plaintiff or prosecution has sought to admit statements
made while under a trance, the results have been essentially the same.3
C. Establishing a Foundation for Hypnotic Evidence
The courts have generally admitted expert testimony as to the nature
26 United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d at 669.
27 Kline v. Ford Motor Co., 523 F.2d at 1067; State v. McQueen, 295 N.C. 96, 244
S.E.2d 414 (1978); Clark v. State, 379 So.2d 372, (Fla. App. 1979).
2S MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 16 (2d ed. Cleary 1972) [hereinafter
cited as MCCORMICK].
29 See discussion accompanying footnotes 57-67 infra.
30 Gardner, The Perception and Memory of Witnesses, 18 CORNELL L.Q. 390, 401 (1933).
31 For a summary of the cases, see Annot., 92 A.L.R.3d 442 (1979).
32 117 Cal. 652, 49 P. 1049 (1897).
33 Id. at 656, 49 P. at 1053.
-"People v. Blair, 25 Cal.3d 640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818 (1979); People v.
Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 718, 273 N.W.2d 539 (1978); Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316(Okla. Crim., 1975); State v. Pierce, 263 S.C. 23, 207 S.E.2d 414 (1974).35 See Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903, (Fla. App. 1976), cert. denied, 336 So.2d 1184(Fla., 1976); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414 (1974).
36 Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d at 904.
37 Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456; Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553, 261 S.E.2d 364 (1979);
People v. Kester, 78 Ill. App.3d 902, 397 N.E.2d 888 (1979).
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and effect of hypnosis to establish a foundation for the admission of a
witness' testimony from a hypno-enhanced recollection. Under the extremely
liberal approach taken in the federal courts, however, the requirement for
such a foundation has been dispensed with "[b]ecause there is no issue about
the admissibility of hypnotically refreshed evidence .... "3 This writer was
unable to find a reported case where tapes of hypnotic sessions or evidence
of statements made under hypnosis were admitted as a foundation for ad-
mitting hypno-enhanced recollection testimony.
Audio or video tapes of hypnotic sessions are frequently proffered
as foundational evidence for expert opinion testimony. 9 Foundational evi-
dence is required in two distinct contexts."0 In cases where the hypnotist's
expert opinion as to the mental state of defendant is offered, statements
under hypnosis have often been offered to establish a foundation. Justice
Traynor, speaking for the California Supreme Court in People v. Modesto,"1
held that tape recordings of hypnotic statements were "clearly" admissible
to establish the foundation for expert testimony on the defendant's mental
state." Pennsylvania, on the other hand, has upheld a trial court's decision
to exclude any evidence that a psychiatrist's opinion was based upon ob-
servations of the defendant while under hypnosis. "3 In Maryland, however,
although hypno-enhanced recollection testimony is admissible, tapes are
excluded as well as any expert opinion based upon observations of the
subject while under hypnosis."
IV. RELIABILITY OF HYPNOSIS
In recent years, numerous courts have recognized that hypnosis is
not reliable.'" Although it has been held that hypnosis should be treated
no differently than any other memory refreshing device,'" hypno-enhanced
recollection, is more appropriately dealt with as scientific evidence. Several
38 United States v. Awkard, 597 F.2d at 699.
30 Under the rules of evidence "a rose by any other name" is often more sweet. Hence, in
many cases where evidence of statements made under hypnosis are excluded as sub-
stantive evidence, the same evidence may be submitted for foundational purposes.
40 Videotapes of hypnotic sessions are also essential in providing the court with basis on
which to judge the reliability of hypnotic evidence prior to exercising its discretion in ad-
mitting or excluding the evidence. For this purpose, however, the ordinary rules of evidence
may not apply. See FED. R. EviD. 104(a).
41 People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d, 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225.
42 Id. at 728, 382 P.2d at 39, 31 Cal. Rptr. at 231.
'3 Commonwealth v. Langley, 468 Pa. 392, 363 A.2d 1126 (1976). However, FED. R. EvID.
403 permits expert opinion testimony even where the basis for the opinion would not be
admissible.
4' State v. Temony, 45 Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240.
45 State v. LaMountain, 125 Ariz. 547, 611 P.2d 551 (1980), People v. Blair, 25 Cal. 3d
640, 602 P.2d 738, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818; State v. Mack . ....... Minn .......... 292 N.W.2d
764 (1980); Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204 S.E.2d 414; People v. Harper,
11I Il. App.2d 204, 250 N.E.2d 5; State v. Temony, 45 Md. App. 569, 414 A.2d 240.
46 See note 27 supra.
[Vol. 14:4
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courts" have applied the standard of admissibility for scientific evidence
established in Frye v. United States's to hypnotic evidence.
In Frye the court excluded results of a systolic blood pressure de-
ception test, a type of primitive lie detector, 9 holding that "the thing from
which the detection is made must be sufficiently established to have gained
general acceptance in the particular field in which it belongs.""0 The court
further modified this standard by requiring that the test enjoy such ac-
ceptance "as would justify the courts in admitting expert testimony de-
duced from the discovery, developments, and experiments thus far made."5
Some courts in applying Frye seem to have overlooked this latter require-
ment. 2 The reliability of memories or statements induced by hypnosis has
little or no relevance to its value as a medical treatment.5 Thus, the general
acceptance of hypnosis in its field, having no relevance to its reliability, should
not be sufficient to justify the admission of hypno-enhanced evidence.
While accepting the unreliability of hypno-enhanced memory, at least
one author has advocated its admission into evidence noting that ordinary
eyewitness testimony may also be unreliable and subject to the witness'
prejudices, fantasies and misperceptions." Spector's theory however, when
subjected to a reducio ad absurdum analysis, would eventually result in the
admission of any and all evidence regardless of reliability. The problem
with Spector's theory is that the traditional guarantees of trustworthiness
as well as the jury's ability to view the demeanor of the witness are wholly
ineffective to reveal distortions of memory induced by the hypnotic process.
As a result of the memory distorting effect of hypnosis in memory en-
hancement, 6 the probative value of the hypno-enhanced memory is marginal
at best; in most cases that value is outweighed by its potential for abuse by
the jury. 7 As will be discussed in Part V, even where stringent safeguards
are followed, hypno-enhanced recollection may be unavoidably and un-
detectably riddled with fantasy and false suggestion. The subject, however,
47 See People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643; State v. Mack ......... Minn ..........
292 N.W.2d 764.
48293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
49 The test was based upon the theory that the conscious effort required to lie resulted
in a slight increase in blood pressure which could be measured and compared to the re-
suilts of responses known to be truthful.
50 Frye v. United States, 293 F. at 1014.
51 Id.
52 People v. Hughes, 99 Misc.2d 863, 417 N.Y.S.2d 643.
53 Diamond, supra note 7, at 317. See, also Spector, supra note 5.
54 Spector, supra note 5.
55 Such as cross examination, sanctity of oath, fear of perjury prosecution, and solemnity
of proceedings. See MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 581-84.
"See textual discussion in Part V infra.
5? See People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 716, 273 N.E.2d 593 and Rodriguez v.
State, 327 So.2d 903. In both cases, hypnotic evidence was excluded due to its potential
for abuse by the jury.
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may be genuinely convinced of the accuracy of his memory, rendering the
traditional guarantees of trustworthiness" useless in assessing what weight
should be given to such testimony. The trier of fact, as a result, is forced
to speculate as to the accuracy of the witness' memory.59 This speculation
seriously weakens the tendency of the hypnotic evidence "to establish the
inference for which it is offered" and thus casts doubt on what probative
force, if any, such evidence has."0 The marginal probative force of such
evidence will, therefore, be readily outweighed by its high potential to
mislead or be abused by the jury.'
V. THE PROBLEMS OF HYPNO-ENHANCED TESTIMONY
Hypnotism is inherently unreliable' and therefore subject to abuse
either by its proponent," the trier of fact' or both. Whereas in most cases
abuse by the proponent may be controlled by stringent procedural safe-
guards,' the inherent unreliability of the technique does not appear to be
sufficiently controllable to give the evidence it produces enough probative
force to outweigh its potential for abuse by the trier of fact. This is not to
say that hypno-enhanced evidence should be per se inadmissible. "' A witness
who has been subjected to a hypnotic memory enhancement procedure
should be permitted to testify only as to pre-hypnosis recollections. This
could be enforced by requiring that the witness' complete recollection prior
to hypnosis be recorded and preserved. "' Only in rare cases where stringent
procedural guidelines are followed will the need for and the probative force
of such evidence outweigh its potential to mislead the jury.
58 See note 55 supra.
89 The task of the trier of fact is to first understand the witness's narration of his recol-
lection while on the stand. Assuming that the narration is not ambiguous or misleading,
it must be determined whether the narration was truthful as to what the witness's recol-
lection is or whether it is a conscious fabrication. Until this point, the traditional guar-
antees of trustworthiness operate with normal effectiveness. However with the hypno-enhanced
recollection, even where the witness truthfully and accurately narrates his recollection of
a given event, there is no way to determine to what extent the subject's memory has
been distorted or altered by hynosis. Here the traditional guarantees fail.
60 MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 436.
"I See textual discussion in Part V(B) infra.
82 See cases cited in note 45 supra. See also Diamond, supra note 7, at 34.
6S An extreme example of abuse of hypnosis is People v. Leyra, 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d
553 (1951). In that case, the defandant was charged with the murder of his elderly
parents. After arresting the defendant, the police hired a psychiatrist who interviewed him
as police secretly taped their conversation. Though the psychiatrist and police denied it,
there was substantial evidence that the psychiatrist put the defendant under hypnosis.
The psychiatrist repeatedly urged the defendant to admit that he had committed the murder
while in the heat of passion. The United States Supreme Court eventually granted habeas
corpus relief upon finding that defendant's confession had been coerced. Leyra v. Denno,
347 U.S. 556 (1954).
6
4 See People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. 716, 273 N.E.2d 593 and Rodriguez v. State,
327 So.2d 903.
65 Professor Diamond has concluded that hypnosis renders a witness incompetent to testify.
Diamond, supra note 7, at 349.
ee See generally, discussion accompanying note 171 infra.
(Vol. 14:4
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For purposes of analysis, the use of hypnotic evidence will be viewed
in terms of its inherent dangers. These dangers may be divided into two distinct
categories. The first category is unreliability which originates in the subject.
Two types of subject-based unreliability, fabrication and confabulation,
will be analyzed. The second category is the unreliability inherent in the
technique of hypnosis itself. Hyper-suggestibility and potential for jury
abuse fall into this category.
A. Subject-Based Unreliability
1. Deliberate Fabrication
It is generally accepted that hypnosis is not a reliable truth determin-
ant." Not only can the hypnotized subject willfully lie,6" but he can also
withhold information from the hypnotist. 69 These are particularly important
considerations when statements made under hypnosis or tapes of hypnotic
sessions are proffered as evidence."0
The problem of deliberate fabrication is magnified by the fact that
even the most skilled therapist may be unable to detect a fabricated re-
sponse.7 This problem becomes particularly acute when the proponent
seeks to introduce statements made under hypnosis to support or bolster
the credibility of the subject's in-court testimony.7" Out-of-court hypnotic
statements have generally been excluded as hearsay when offered for this
purpose.7
The ability to fabricate under hypnosis is also a serious problem where
a witness is called to testify in court while under a hypnotic trance. No
American court has yet permitted a hypnotized witness to testify before ajury." In most cases, it would seem that the spectacle of a witness under-
going a hypnotic trance and the resulting potential for unduly arousing
the emotions and prejudices of the jury would surely outweigh the probative
valve of any evidence so derived.
A somewhat similar danger arises from the ability of some
subjects to simulate a trance without detection by the hypnotist. This cre-
67 Orne, supra note 7, at 139. Ladd, Legal Aspects of Hypnotism, I1 YALE LJ. 173, 187
(1902).
68 Orne, supra note 7, at 139.
69 Field & Dworbin, Strategies of Hypnotic Interrogation, 67 J. PsYcH. 47, 55 (Sept. 1967).
70 Presumably, if the subject fabricates his recollections while under hypnosis, he would
also be lying if he recounted the same recollection on the witness stand. In this case,
the traditional guarantees of trustworthiness would be effective.
71 Spector, supra note 5, at 594.
72 People v. Hangsleben, 86 Mich. App. at 723, 273 N.W.2d at 544.7 3 See Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903; Greenfield v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 710, 204
S.E.2d 414.
'4See discussion in note 19 supra. Also see Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp. 1113(W.D. Va. 1976) where the court approved the trial judge's refusal to permit the defendant
to testify while in a trance.
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ates a problem whenever hypnotic statements are offered for any purpose,
or whenever an expert opinion that is based upon observations of the sub-
ject (under what the expert believes to be a trance) is sought to be ad-
mitted. Some subjects simulating hypnosis have performed remarkable feats
of strength and endurance while under a feigned trance.7" Because the
simulation of the hypnotic state may go undiscovered, the trier of fact is
forced to speculate the validity of the evidence.
Procedural safeguards traditionally thought to insure reliability of in-
court testimony"6 are wholly inadequate when applied to statements made
under hypnosis, whether made prior to, or during trial. Because there is
no reliable way to detect or deter prevarication by the hypnotized subject,
it is difficult to conceive of an adequate procedural substitute for the tra-
ditional safeguards. It has been argued,"' however, that statements made
during hypnotic age-regression should be admitted under the present-sense
impression exception to the hearsay rule."' Professors Spector and Foster
assert that, inasmuch as a subject under hypnotic age-regression "re-wit-
nesses" the event in question, the memory and perception "infirmities"79 of
hearsay evidence are cured." Applying Professor Tribe's ingenious "Testi-
monial Triangle" 1 analysis of hearsay, Spector and Foster reach the con-
clusion that statements made during age-regression are strong "right leg
hearsay," and therefore should be admitted." This analysis fails however,
because its basic premise, that age-regression effectively cures the testimonial
infirmities of memory and perception, is wholly inaccurate. What may ap-
pear to be accurate recollection of an event may actually be riddled with fan-
tasy and false suggestion indiscriminantly adopted by the subject while under
the hypnotic trance.8 Though it masks the symptoms of the right-leg testi-
monial infirmities, hypnosis may actually render the infirmity incurable.
Even if the hearsay rule were not applicable, statements made while
under hypnosis should rarely be admitted for any purpose because of their
unreliability and potential to mislead the jury."' Hypnotic evidence should
75 Orne, supra note 7, at 137.
76 See note 55 supra for a list.
77 Spector, supra note 5, at 608.
78 Classic hearsay analysis would be applicable to any out-of-court statement. See MCCOR-
MICK, supra note 28, at 579. See also FED. R. EVID: 803(1).
79 Spector, supra note 5.
80 See Tribe, Triangulating Hearsay, 87 HARV. L.R. 957, 959 (1954) for a modular ap-
proach to hearsay and a discussion of this problem.
81 Id. at 959.
82 Spector, supra note 5, at 608. Under Tribe's analysis "one good leg is enough" to
permit an exception to the hearsay rule. Tribe, supra note 80.
83 See discussion of confabulation in text accompanying notes 88-115 and suggestion in text
accompanying notes 118-74 infra.
" See discussion of the effect of hypnosis on the jury in the text accompanying notes 175-77.
intra.
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only be admitted where the need for it 5 and its probative force" exceed
its potential for abuse by the trier of fact.' The same holds true when the
proponent seeks to have a witness testify while in a trance.
2. Confabulation
The tendency of the hypnotized subject to confabulate is the second
category of subject-based unreliability. Confabulation is the tendency of
the hypnotized subject to fill in memory gaps with false and fantasized bits
of information.8 The hypno-enhanced recollection is likely to be a "mosaic
of (1) appropriate actual events, (2) entirely irrelevant actual events, (3)
pure fantasy, and fantasized details supplied to make a logical whole."89
In one experiment, subjects memorized various poems prior to undergoing
hypnosis. Later, while under hypnosis, they were asked to recite the poems
they had memorized. Although the subjects remembered more than they
could without hypnotism, they also made more mistakes than they did
prior to undergoing hypnosis, sometimes confabulating entire verses."0
The case of Emmett v. Ricketts5 ' appears to be a graphic example of
confabulation by a hypnotized subject. The case involved the sensational
murders of a Mr. and Mrs. Mathews at their home in Georgia. The con-
victions of Emmett and co-defendant Creamer (one of several co-con-
spirators tried separately) resulted almost entirely from the testimony of
one Deborah Kidd, who was with the defendants at the time of the murders.
Kidd was a drug addict and a prostitute, and prior to trial was housed
with a police detective with whom she admitted having had intimate re-
lations. On several occasions, Kidd was taken to a psychiatrist and hypno-
tized under the pretense of treating her drug addiction. In reality, Kidd
was hypnotized in order to refresh her recollection of the murders. Kidd
testified that after Mr. Mathews had been shot and killed, she found Creamer
shot and wounded in a utility room in the house. No trace of blood type A
(Creamer's type) was found. Kidd also testified that she saw Mrs. Mathews
85 The need for the questionable evidence may be considered in assessing its value. The
need for the evidence is a function of the availability of other probative but less prejudicial
evidence. MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 439. See Greenfield v. Robinson, 413 F. Supp.
1113, where the court approved the exclusion of statements made by the defendant during
pretrial hypnosis even though there were no eyewitnesses to the crime and the defendant
asserted unconsciousness as a defense.
8 6 See generally MCCORMICK, supra note 28, at 438.
87 C.f. Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) in which the court held, that in the
context of the facts of that case, the prejudicial effect of excluding otherwise properly
excludable hearsay evidence denied the defendant his right to fair trial. Chambers stands
for the proposition that necessity may outweigh the hearsay rules. See also People v. Blair,
25 Cal.3d 640, 159 Cal. Rptr. 818, 602 P.2d 738. Distinguishing Chambers, the Blair court
excluded hypno-enhanced testimony as being unreliable and not critical to defendant's case.88 See Dillhoff, supra note 19, at 5.
89 Diamond, supra note 7, at 335.
00Id.
91 397 F. Supp. 1025 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
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heavily beaten by another co-conspirator, and that when she (Kidd) at-
tempted to flee, Creamer gave chase and threw an ax which landed in a
tree. An autopsy of Mrs. Mathews' body disclosed no evidence of beating
and the police were unable to find any trace of an ax or ax marks on the
premises. Kidd "recalled" several other details that were either unsupportable
or contrary to the tangible evidence." There is no way to determine whether
or to what degree Kidd's recollections were confabulated, but it is clear
that Kidd's hypno-enhanced recollection was highly unreliable.
As is the case with fabrication, the hypnotist is unable to distinguish the
true recollections from the untrue or confabulated ones. 3 The hypnotized
subject tends to be eager to satisfy the hypnotist's demands for detailed
recollections of the event under investigation. '  At the same time,
hypnotic age-regression seems to make the subject less concerned
with the accuracy cf his memory than he would normally be. 3 This is
significant because in one's memory of any given event, there are likely
to be many gaps and missing details.08 A hypnotized subject will fill in the
gaps with fantasized details to make what appears to be a full, detailed
recollection of the event.9 7 Not only will the hypnotist be unable to dis-
tinguish fact from fantasy, but the subject himself will generally be un-
aware, even after hypnosis, that part of his recollections were the result
of confabulation."
In view of the tendency to confabulate false memories, it has been
suggested that the reliability of the subject's hypno-enhanced recollection
may be determined by independent corroboration of newly recalled facts.9
Several courts have considered the independent corroboration of parts
of the post-hypnosis recollection in permitting the subject to testify from
his enhanced recollection. 10 The mere fact that there are some corroborated
facts in the witness's hypno-enhanced recollection, however, is not a basis
for concluding that the entire recollection is accurate.' Indeed, if the
important aspects of a witness's recollection can be corroborated, the ex-
92 Id. at 1030-33.
93 Diamond, supra note 7, at 337.
94 Id.
5 Orne, supra note 7, at 136.
98 See discussion accompanying footnotes 122-26.
97 See note 89 supra.
98 Diamond, supra note 7, at 337.
99 People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181.
100 United States v. Miller, 411 F.2d 825 (2d Cir. 1969); United States v. Narisco, 446
F. Supp. 252 (E.D. Mich. 1977); People v. Smrekar, 68 Ill. App 379, 385 N.E.2d 848
(1979); People v. Harding, 54 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302. See also Perrifield v. State,
400 N.E.2d 146 (Ind. 1980) where the court approved the witness's post-hypnosis identi-
fication of the defendant because it had a "sufficient independent basis."
101 Diamond, supra note 7, at 338.
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istence of such other evidence substantially lessens the need for the hypnotic
evidence, thereby reducing its probative value.' °
The subject's confidence in his newly refreshed recollection is also
useless as evidence of the accuracy thereof.' The subject may be both
convinced and convincing as to the accuracy of his recollection despite
the tendency of confabulate."' The subject's confidence in the accuracy
of his recollections may result from "posthypnotic source amnesia" which
occurs when a subject retains memories created under hypnosis but does
not recall that the memories were acquired while under a trance. 5 The
subject thus assumes that the memory, which may have been partially or
wholly confabulated (or falsely suggested),"' was acquired from personal
experience.' "Such a belief can be unshakable, last a lifetime, and be
immune to cross examination."'08 Hence, it is impossible for the trier of
fact, by observing the witness during testimony, to distinguish between
confabulated recollections and recollections derived from actual experience.
The traditional guarantees of trustworthiness.. would be ineffective in
exposing confabulation because the subject is sincerely convinced of the
accuracy of his recollection.
The expert hypnotist is also unable to detect the presence of con-
fabulation."' In spite of this, several writers have suggested that expert
opinion testimony as to the reliability of the newly-recalled facts is an
adequate safeguard of the trustworthiness of hypnotic evidence."' Experts
who attempt to sort fact from fantasy generally base their opinion on the
specificity of detail, and the independent corroboration of new facts. Re-
gardless of expertise, however, the accuracy of the hypno-enhanced recol-
lection can not be verified."
The only way to avoid the misleading effects of confabulation is
to exclude testimony from the present, hypnotically refreshed recollec-
tion."' Although any recollections acquired under hypnosis may be used
in the conduct of an investigation, testimony therefrom should not ordinarily
be admitted due to the high potential to mislead the jury. Hence, in any
case where hypnotic memory enhancement is used, the subject's complete
102 See McCoRMIcK, supra note 28, at 439.
103 Diamond, supra note 7, at 339.
104 Orne, supra note 7, at 136.
105 Diamond, supra note 7, at 336.
106 See discussion accompanying footnotes 118-30. infra.
107 See Note, Hypnotism, Suggestibility and the Law, 31 NEB. L.R. 575, 583 (1952).
108 Diamond, supra note 7, at 336.
lo See note 55 supra.
110 See discussion accompanying footnotes 93-98 supra.
1I Spector, supra note 5, at 593; Present Recollection Restored, supra note 8.
112 Diamond, supra note 7, at 336.
"13 Dillhoff, supra note 19, at 21.
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pre-hypnosis recollection should be recorded and preserved."" In one case
that admitted hypno-enhanced testimony, the court was satisfied that the
witness had testified as to what parts of his testimony came from recollec-
tions restored by hypnosis.115 It would be preferable, however, to have an
independent record of the subject's pre-hypnosis recollection. The record
could be used to insure that the witness was not testifying from his hypno-
enhanced (and thus unreliable) recollection.
B. Technique-based Unreliability
The analysis of technique-based unreliability is divided into two cate-
gories. The first involves probably the most dramatic characteristic of the
hypnotism, the susceptibility of the hypnotized subject to hypnotic sug-
gestion." 6 The second category concerns high potential for prejudice which
accompanies the mere knowledge of the fact that a witness was subject
to hypnosis."'
1. Suggestibility
The hypnotized subject, by definition, manifests a "heightened degree
of suggestibility."'1 8 In fact, suggestibility and hypnosis are virtually synony-
mous in the eyes of some experts. 9 The subject's desire to please his
hypnotist' makes him particularly receptive to express or implicit sug-
guestions.'2 ' Suggestion may come from any one of a variety of sources
and may originate before or after the actual trance. In either case, sug-
gestions may become an integral part of the total hypnotic experience.'
The hypnotist is capable, in varying degrees, of planting totally false
memories in the subject's mind. One writer describes an experiment in
which he falsely suggested to his patient the memory of a one-hour session
when in fact, the session was only one-half hour. When billed thereafter,
the patient paid for a full hour without question.' In another experiment,
a hypnotized subject was told that he had overheard a Communist plot
1A4 This has been advanced as a procedural safeguard by courts that more readily admit
hypnotic evidence. See People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, State
v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291.
"5 Connolly v. Farmer, 484 F.2d 456.
a16Te characteristic problems of hypnosis are categorized here only for the purposes
of analysis. In reality these characteristics may blend together in varying degrees to make
up the total hypnotic experience.
-7 This is not to be confused with the prejudicial effect that is an outgrowth of the un-
reliability caused by the problems of fabrication, confabulation and suggestion. Here,
prejudice and abuse result from a disclosure to the jury that the witness was hypnotized
in an effort to obtain testimony.
Us See Spector, supra note 5, at 570.
119 HiLARm, supra note 12.
12ODiamond, supra note 7, at 333.
131 Spector, supra note 5, at 578.
122 Diamond, supra note 7, at 336.
128 Levendula, supra note 16, at 342.
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to take over the television networks. After being awakened, the subject
reported his discovery to a network news correspondent. Though the sub-
ject was given no details of the plot, he reported the plot replete with
fully fantasized, elaborate detail. Later the subject could not be shaken
from his story even under hypnosis."'
The subject, after being awakened, may have no memory that the
false recollection was planted during hypnosis by way of suggestion." 5 In
fact, the subject may not even recall having been put under a trance. Hence,
the ability to effectively cross-examine the witness who testifies from hypno-
enhanced recollections may be extremely limited.'
Despite the inability to detect the effects of suggestion and confabu-
lation'" on the hypno-enhanced recollection, some courts have placed
the burden on the opponent of hypnotic evidence to show that the hypnotic
process has tainted the witness's testimony, or that the testimony of the
witness did not come from the witness's true memory uncontaminated by
hypnosis.'28 An example of the latter situation is People v. McDowell,"9 a
schizophrenic case in which the court recognized all of the inherent dangers
of hypnotic memory enhancement, but at the same time ignored them. The
McDowell court, recognizing the problems of confabulation and suggesti-
bility, set forth a comprehensive list of procedural safeguards designed to
deal with those problems. The safeguards included the following require-
ments: 1) that the hypnotist be a qualified expert; 2) that the hypnotist be
independent and unbiased; 3) that the hypnotist know as little about the
case as possible prior to hypnotizing the subject and that the only infor-
mation given to the hypnotist be in writing; 4) that all contacts between
the hypnotist and subject be videotaped; 5) that only the hypnotist and
subject be present during the procedure; 6) that an extensive pre-hypnosis
interview be conducted; 7) that the subject's complete recollection be re-
corded prior to hypnosis, 8) that the hypnotist not be suggestive in any
way during any contact with the subject; and, finally, 9) that all new facts
be independently corroborated.' The McDowell court, however, also be-
came the first court to ignore nearly every one of the guidelines established
thereby."' McDowell, it seems, only paid lip-service to the need for "ex-
124 TIME, May 24, 1968, at 59.
125 See notes 105-09 supra, and accompanying text.
12 1d.
127 See note 93 supra, and accompanying text.
128Pavone v. State ......... Ind .......... 402 N.E.2d 976 (1980); People v. McDowell, 103
Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
129 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181 (1980).
130 1d. at 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 183-84.
131 The hypnotist in McDowell was not independent, information received by the hypnotist
prior to hypnotizing the witness was not in writing, not all contacts between the hypnotist
and subject were taped or recorded, no pre-hypnotic examination was conducted, the
subject's complete recollection prior to hypnosis was not recorded except for a statement
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treme caution 132 in the use of hypnosis. Despite the failure to follow seven
of the nine guidelines set out by the court, McDowell's motion to supress
the evidence was denied. 183
Many of the procedural guidelines advanced by courts and writers13
have been primarily concerned with the control of the characteristic sus-
ceptibility of hypnotized subjects to suggestion. The reason for this is that
suggestibility is subject to control by the hypnotist to a far greater extent
than the tendency to confabulate and the ability to fabricate while under
a trance. Because of its controllability, the hyper-suggestibility of the
hypnotized subject has been the object of a great deal of intentional and
unintentional abuse. As will be shown, in no way do the guidelines sug-
gested guarantee the reliability of the hypno-enhanced recollection, which
as a result of confabulation, hyper-suggestibility and the ability to fabricate,
is inherently unreliable. As a result, in most cases, a witness should only be
permitted to testify as to his pre-hypnosis recollections.'36 Only where the
most stringent safeguards are followed, and the need for the hypnotic evi-
dence is great should such evidence be admitted."'
Proponents claim that the guidelines advanced by the courts and com-
mentators justify admitting hypnotic statements into evidence. The ef-
fectiveness of these guidelines, however, even if strictly followed, is over-
rated by their respective proponents. At best, these guidelines would only
permit admission of such evidence in rare cases where the extreme need for
it gives it sufficient probative value to outweigh the potential to mislead the
jury.
A safeguard commonly proposed is that the hypnotist simply avoid
making undue suggestions to the subject.' It is impossible, however, for
the hypnotist to completely avoid suggestion. 9 Even if the hypnotist is
able to avoid giving conscious cues, the subject is susceptible to a myriad
of cues from the hypnotist which are unintentionally or unconsciously given.
The hypnotist's attitude, reaction to responses, body language, voice quality
given to the police before hypnosis was even contemplated, and instead of requiring
independent corroboration of new facts, the court actually presumed that the new facts
were reliable because the defendant was unable to offer contradictory evidence.
132 People v. McDowell, 103 Misc. 2d at 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 185.
133 Id.
-4 See United States v. Adams, 581 F.2d 193; State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414
A.2d 291; People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181.
135 E.g., Dillhoff, supra note 19; Spector, supra note 5; see also Comment, Hypno-Induced
Statements: Safeguards for Admissibility, 1970 LAw & Soc. ORDER 99 [hereinafter cited as
Hypno-Induced Statements].
136 See discussion in text accompanying notes 110-15.
'
3 7 See note 85 supra.
238 See People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181; Dillhoff, supra note 19,
at 8.
139 Diamond, supra note 7, at 333.
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and tonal inflection, and other unintentional behavior may all be suggestive
of a desired response. 4 ' The deeply hypnotized subject can be remarkably
sensitive to the most minute cues, many of which may go unnoticed even
by a trained observer . 4 1
It is also generally required that the hypnotist have expert qualifica-
tions. " ' Presumably an expert, being knowledgeable on the susceptibility of the
subject to suggestion, would be more capable of avoiding it. Hypnotists are
often asked to render expert opinions as to the mental state"43 and veracity 4 4
of defendants. The expert hypnotist is generally permitted to render an
opinion as to the nature and effect of hypnosis.4 5 Few cases, have estab-
lished what qualifications a person must have to be considered an "expert."
No case was found where the court considered qualifications other than
the hypnotist's medical or technical training. However, it is possible to be
highly skilled in the technique of inducing a hypnotic trance yet be wholly
ignorant of its scientific and psychological effects and the legal ramifica-
tions of using the technique on a prospective witness.' 6 Those untrained
in the true nature and effect of hypnosis, though skilled in its use, often
assume clearly false beliefs as to the usefulness of the technique. When
these so called "experts" are permitted to testify for any purpose regarding
the hypnotic process, they may convey the same misinformation to the
trier of fact.' If hypno-enhanced recollection testimony is allowed, the
140 Id.
1410rne, On the Simulating Subject as a Quasi Control Group in Hypnosis Research, in
HYPNOSIS RESEARCH DEVELOPMENTS AND PERSPECTIVES 399, 402 (E. Fromm & R. Shor
eds. 1972).
L42 See Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 135, at 108; People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d
at 831, 427 N.Y.S.2d at 183; State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super at 340, 414 A.2d at 306;
Spector, supra note 5, at 593. Expert qualifications should be required not only to allow the
hypnotist to testify (whether to establish a foundation for the admission of hypno-enhanced
recollection testimony or to render an opinion) but also to conduct the hypnotic procedure
Itself. See also People v. Busch, 56 Cal.2d 868, 366 P.2d 314, 16 Cal. Rptr. 898 (1961)
(hypnotist not permitted to testify due to doubt as to qualifications).
'43 People v. Hiser, 267 Cal. App.2d 47, 72 Cal. Rptr. 906 and People v. Modesto, 59
Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225 (expert mental state testimony admitted);
contra, Jones v. State, 542 P.2d 1316.
'" E.g., People v. Kester, 78 Ill. App. 3d 902, 397 N.E.2d 888; Jones v. State, 542 P.2d
1316 (expert testimony as to truthfulness admitted). See also State v. Temoney, 45 Md.
App. 569, 414 A.2d 240, where witness was permitted to testify from hypno-enhanced recol-
lection but hypnotist's expert opinions based upon observations of witness while under
hypnosis were excluded because the technique of hypnosis was still controversial.
'44 People v. Modesto, 59 Cal.2d 722, 382 P.2d 33, 31 Cal. Rptr. 225; Clark v. State, 379
So.2d 372.
1* Diamond, supra note 7, at 341.
'47In People v. Davis, No. 52660 (Super Ct. Placer County Calif. July 30, 1979) dis-
cussed in Diamond, supra note 7, at 347 n. 137-38, the policeman hypnotist told the subject
that the mind stores memories with photographic detail and that after hypnosis she would
have photographic recall of everything discussed under hypnosis. Not only could this give
the subject undue confidence in her post-hypnotic recollection (no matter how distorted by
confabulation and suggestion) but such clearly false information, if given to the jury, would
almost certainly cause it to give undue credence to the subject's testimony
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hypnotic procedure producing it should be carried out by a hypnotist with
expert qualifications in the psychological, technical and legal ramifications
of its use.
Frequently, the hypnotist is permitted to take the stand and testify as
to the reliability of his own procedures. Unfortunately, however, many
hypnotists have unjustified and undying faith in their own competence. Sev-
eral cases were found where the hypnotist erroneously testified that the
hypnotic procedure was conducted so that it was free of suggestion. In
State v. Hurd,"8 the subject was the victim of a knife attack in her bedroom.
The only two suspects were the victim's ex-husband, the defendant, and
the victim's current husband. The victim was unable to identify her attacker.
Prior to hypnosis, the hypnotist was insistent that the victim identify her
assailant; he told her that failure to identify the attacker would allow him
an opportunity to return and kill her thereby leaving her children motherless,
and that her present husband would remain a suspect so long as she failed
to identify another person. At one point, while under hypnosis, the hypnotist
said to the subject "You are sitting at the foot of the bed,"1 9 even though
the subject had never stated that she was at the foot of the bed at the time
of the attack. 5 ' Dr. Orne, a psychiatrist who testified at the trial, was highly
critical of the hypnotist's techniques in the case. Dr. Orne observed that
the victim's husband, though supposedly a suspect, was permitted to ac-
company the victim when she was hypnotized implying that he had been
eliminated as a suspect. Another more flagrant example of suggestion oc-
curred when, under hypnosis, the victim said she knew her attacker, to
which the hypnotist then asked "Is it [your husband] David?" She replied,
"No." The hypnotist then asked "Is it [the defendant] Paul? The victim
replied "Yes.""' The hypnotist insisted that the procedure was not coercive
or suggestive in any way.
A similar situation occurred in People v. Davis,"2 where a witness to
a robbery-murder was hypnotized to enhance her recollection of the assail-
ants. While under hypnosis the following dialogue occurred:
Hypnotist: Now Connie, I'm going to count to three . . . and when
I do, these two people who were wearing masks, you'll be
looking at them . . . One, two, three. That's fine. How
many of them are there?"
Subject: Two.'
The policeman hypnotist testified at the evidentiary hearing that the procedure
148 173 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291.
'
4 9 Id. at 342, 414 A.2d at 300.
0 The subject's position at the time of the attack could have been relevant as to her ability
to have seen the face of her attacker.
251 State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super, 333, 336, 414 A.24 291, 294.
252 See note 147, supra,
253Id
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was free of suggestion. As a matter of strategy for the opponent, it is
essential that the hypnotic procedure be evaluated by an impartial, expert
hypnotist. Such a person would be far more likely to render a competent,
unbiased opinion of the reliability of the procedure than the person who
conducted the procedure.
Not only must the hypnotist who conducts the hypnotic procedure be
a qualified expert, he must also be independent and unbiased."" The pro-
cedure should be conducted in neutral surroundings, possibly the hypnotist's
private office, rather than a police station.'55 This is one of the most abused
areas in the use of hypnotic evidence.
In People v. Leyra,150 a police-hired psychologist hypnotized the de-
fendant, who was exhausted from sleeplessness, under the context of "help-
ing" him.1" The psychiatrist not only suggested a confession, but insisted
upon one. ' In another case, not involving police abuse, it was discovered
after the defendant was convicted of murder that the prosecutor's identifica-
tion witness had been repeatedly hypnotized prior to trial by a friend of
the victim. The court denied the defendant's petition for post-conviction
relief, finding this newly discovered evidence to be merely "cumulative and
impeaching."'"
In United States v. Miller,' the prosecutor himself hypnotized a key
identification witness without disclosing the fact to the defendant. In grant-
ing defendant's motion for a new trial, Judge Friendly wisely observed that:
[A]s the record stands, the hypnosis had arguably placed at least some
obstacle in the way of one of the most valuable protections accorded
Miller by the Sixth Amendment- the possibility that the sanctity of the
oath and effective cross-examination might lead [the eyewitness] to
recant his identification or at least to admit some doubt.'0 '
The court was clearly aware that hypnosis of the witness went far beyond
mere pre-trial coaching, and that it had a great impact on the traditional
guarantees of trustworthiness."0 2
A case of unintentional abuse of the hyper-suggestibility of the subject
is that of United States v. Andrews,"3 where a low ranking sailor, the victim
'5 Also suggested as a guideline in State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 348, 414 A.2d 291,
306 and People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.2d 831, 834, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183.
55 See State v. Hurd, 137 N.J.-Super 333, 414 A.2d 291; People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.
831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181; Dilloff, supra note 19, at 7.
'1' 302 N.Y. 353, 98 N.E.2d 553.
157 Id. at 360, 98 N.E.2d at 557.
2
5
s See discussion of Leyra at note 63 supra.
159 Lawson v. State, 280 N.W.2d 400 (Iowa 1979).
100411 F.2d 825.
101 Id. at 832.
162 See note 55 supra.
115 General Court Martial No. 75-14 (N.E. Jud. Cir., Navy-Marine Corps Judiciary, Phila.,
Pa., Oct. 6, 1975), discussed in Dilloff, supra note 19,
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of a shooting, was hypnotized by a Navy commander. The commander-hyp-
notist hypnotized the sailor to "assist" him in identifying the assailant. In
fact, the commander actually ordered the hypnotized sailor to remember
the assailant's face. Since the sailor was trained to obey his superiors and
desirous of pleasing the hypnotist as are many hypnotic subjects,'" it is
not unlikely that the face he described was at least partly the result of con-
fabulation.
There are two significant dangers in using a biased hypnotist. The
subject, anxious to satisfy the hypnotist's inquiries, is likely to confabulate
a response he believes will be pleasing to the hypnotist. Compounding this
danger is the fact that a biased hypnotist may unwittingly suggest desired
responses. In order to avoid these dangers it is essential that the hypnotist
be independent in fact and also appear to the subject to be independent. 6
It is not enough that the hypnotist be impartial. In order to further
avoid the possibility that the hypnotist will unwittingly suggest false recol-
lections, it is necessary that the hypnotist know as little as possible about
the case prior to hypnotizing the subject.16" Additionally, whatever pre-hyp-
nosis information should be transmitted to him only in writing so that the
extent of information that may have been suggested to the subject may be
determined. This, however, does not preclude the hypnotist from improperly
suggesting to the subject false information which he has deduced or as-
sumed from the preliminary responses of the subject.
The surroundings in which the subject is hypnotized should not be sug-
gestive. 6 Aside from the neutrality of the location itself, there should be
no other person present during the proceedings who might influence the
subject in the highly suggestible, hypnotized state."6 8 In many cases the
subject was hypnotized in the presence of police officers or detectives" 9
who may have had a tendency to suggest false recollections to the subject.
The subject should also be protected from the possibility of undue sug-
gestion from biased persons and surroundings immediately before and after
hypnosis, as suggestion during that time may be integrated in the subject's
hypno-enhanced recollection. 17
Once the witness has been subject to hypnosis, it is essential that op-
posing parties and the trial judge be able to fully review the procedure in
1" See text accompanying note 94, supra.
165 Dilloff, supra note 19, at 8.
166 State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super. 333, 348, 414 A.2d 291, 306; People v. McDowell, 103
Misc.2d 831, 834, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181, 183.
167 See State v. Hurd, 137 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291; People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.
831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181; Dilloff, supra note 19, at 7.
168 Id.
169 E.g., Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302 (1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S.
949 (1969); State v. Hurd, 173 N.J. Super 333, 414 A.2d 291.
170 Diamond, supra note 7, at 336.
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order to determine whether it has been unduly suggestive. All contacts be-
tween the hypnotist and the subject should be videotaped or filmed.""
Stenographic records or audio tape recordings can not provide a sufficiently
complete record due to the fact that the person under a hypnotic trance
is subject to many stimuli that can not be recorded by these media. Professor
Diamond warns, however, that the mere knowledge of the subject that the
proceedings will be taped can be a "powerful distorting factor" inasmuch
as the knowledge that one is being filmed or recorded can alter one's be-
havior."" Recording the proceedings then, may contribute to the contami-
nation of the subject's recollection.
It also has been suggested that attorneys for both parties be present at
the proceedings.' However, in order to avoid the potential for undue sug-
gestion by the presence of biased parties, it would'be preferable that the
attorneys and any other persons observing the procedure do so outside
of the subject's notice or knowledge, for example, via a two-way mirror
or closed circuit television. Professor Diamond's concern would be pertinent
here also inasmuch as the mere knowledge that one is being watched or
recorded may have a distorting effect.
A thorough review of the records of the hypnotic proceedings should
be required for a trial court to make an evaluation of the admissibility of
the hypno-enhanced evidence. In the rare case that this type of evidence
is admitted, it would seem that a full record of the proceedings, or the
presence of the opposing counsel at the proceeding would be essential if
effective confrontation and examination of the witness is to be guaranteed.'
None of the guidelines discussed entirely eliminates the potential for
suggestion. Further, they are useless in controlling the subject-based dangers
of hypnosis: of fabrication and confabulation. Even following the strictest
guidelines, the probative value of hypnotic evidence remains marginal be-
cause the jury still must speculate as to the accuracy of the witness's recol-
lection. Without minimal guidelines, however, the probative value of such
evidence will surely be outweighed by its potential to mislead and be
abused by the trier of fact.
2. The Potential to Mislead the Trier of Fact
The other form of technique-based unreliability is that the mere
171 See State v. Hurd, 137 N.J. Super. 333, 414 A.2d 291; People v. McDowell, 103 Misc.
831, 427 N.Y.S.2d 181; Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 135.
172 Diamond, supra note 7, at 339.
1T3 Dilloff, supra note 19, at 8; Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 135, at 117.
174 It is the very rare case indeed that opposing counsel could effectively cross-examine a
witness whose memory was enhanced -by hypnosis inasmuch as the witness may very sin-
cerely believe in the accuracy of his recollections, parts or all of which could be the
result of confabulation and suggestion. Counsel in this case might be limited to simply
exposing the fact of hypnosis to the trier of fact and developing the hazards of hypno-
enhanced recollection through expert testimony. This, however, still may leave the trier of
fact simply to speculate as to what weight to attach to the witness's testimony.
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knowledge that the witness's memory has been hypno-enhanced can, in and
of itself, have a prejudicial effect on the trier of fact. The cautionary or
limiting instruction and expert foundation testimony are commonly sug-
gested devices to avoid the abuse of hypnotic evidence by the jury.1"5 Be-
cause the witness may be thoroughly convinced of the accuracy of his hypno-
enhanced recollection, the jury may be wholly unable to determine the
credibility of the testimony. If such evidence is to be admitted at all, an
explicit foundation must be established, detailing the nature and effect of
hypnosis as well as its characteristic unreliability as a truth-determinant and
memory-enhancer. Otherwise, the popularly conceived notions that one
cannot lie while under hypnosis or that hypnosis can revive recollections
with perfectly accurate, photographic detail, may lead the jury to the er-
roneous conclusion that hypnotic evidence is uncontrovertible."
In addition to a proper foundation, the hypnotic evidence should be
accompanied by a strict cautionary instruction." Where hypnotic evidence
is itself used as a foundation for expert testimony, the jury should be care-
fully instructed not to use such evidence for substantive purposes. In any
case, where hypnotic evidence is admitted, the jury instructions should stress
the limitation of hypnosis as a memory-enhancer. The jury should be re-
minded that hypnosis is not a truth determinant, rather it is merely a
device to ferret out once lost memories, and that with the grains of these
memories may come a significant amount of chaff.
The court's instruction should also delineate the jury's task in assessing
the weight of testimony from the hypno-enhanced recollection. The jury
must first sift through the witness's narration and determine whether he
has truthfully testified as to what his present recollection is. The jury must
then determine whether what the witness now conceives to be his present
recollection has been significantly altered by the hypnotic process. Inas-
much as the experts themselves can not determine the extent to which a
subject's recollections have been tainted by hypnosis, the jury may, at this
point, find itself up the proverbial creek with little more than speculation
with which to paddle. Finally, if the jury determines that the witness was
truthful and that his recollections were not significantly tainted by the
hypnotic process, it must then determine whether the recollection was founded
upon observations that were accurately perceived in the first place. By de-
275 See, e.g., Wyller v. Fairchild Hiller Corp., 503 F.2d 506; Collier v. State, 244 Ga. 553,
261 S.E.2d 364; Harding v. State, 5 Md. App. 230, 246 A.2d 302.
170 Present Recollection Restored, supra note 8. See also Rodriguez v. State, 327 So.2d 903.
ITT See Dilloff, supra note 19, at 22; Hypno-Induced Statements, supra note 135, at 119.
The following contain sample instructions: Present Recollection Restored, supra note 8, at
372 n.147, Spector, supra note 5, at 595 n.141. Spector's instruction is highly misleading in
that it states that "the fact that a witness has been hypnotized does not bear on his
credibility .... " This is deceptive in as much as the sincerity of the witness on the stand
is not relevant to whether and to what degree his hypno-enhanced recollection is distorted
and altered by confabulation and suggestion.
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fining the jury's task in this way, the court can greatly assist the jury in its
use of hypnotic evidence.
VI. CONCLUSION
Undoubtedly, hypnosis can be an effective means by which investigators
can discover facts formerly lost in the unconscious memories of witnesses.
The hypnotic subject, however, may unwittingly confabulate memories
where there once were none, and adopt suggested false memories that
modify or displace memories already present. Unfortunately, the experts'
understanding of the process has not yet advanced to the point where it
is possible to reliably detect the memory-distorting effects of the hypnotic
process.
The probative value of the hypnotized subject's statements or subse-
quent testimony is doubtful. In most cases, it appears that the jury's evalu-
ation of the reliability of such evidence is premised upon speculation, in
which event the minimal probative force of the evidence is far outweighed
by its potential to mislead. Even when the most stringent safeguards are
followed, hypnotic evidence is only marginally probative at best and only
a great need for the evidence can warrant its admission.
KEVIN L. PELANDA
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